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Robotics and Autonomous Systems (RAS) become ever more rely-
ing on deep learning components to support their perception and
decision making. Given RAS will inevitably be applied to safety crit-
ical applications, efforts are needed to ensure that the deep learning
is safe and reliable. In this lecture, I will give a brief overview on
recent progress in the verification and validation techniques for
deep learning, focusing on two major safety and reliability risks, i.e.,
robustness and generalisation. We consider formal verification, sta-
tistical evaluation, reliability assessment, and runtime monitoring
techniques, all of which complement with each other in provid-
ing assurance to the reliability of deep learning in operation. The
challenges and future directions will also be discussed.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Software and its engineering → Software verification and
validation; • Theory of computation → Machine learning
theory.
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For robotics and autonomous systems (RAS) that are designed to
work with real-world applications, deep learning becomes neces-
sary for its ability to implement – by learning from massive data
– complex functions that are hard to be programmed directly. Ef-
fective approaches are therefore called for to show whether or not
a deep learning component is safe and reliable. Deep learning is
an over-parameterised function learned from a set of data by min-
imising a loss function. Unlike traditional systems, deep learning
is not developed in a way that can fully take into consideration
specifications other than the accuracy [21]. This makes verification
and validation (V&V) methods, which are independent from the
design and implementation, become more important than ever.
This lecture will focus on the V&V methods for reliability, which
requires the deep learning to function correctly for a period of time.
As suggested in [25, 26], we believe the reliability of deep learning
is actually determined by two currently intensively-studied risks,
i.e., Reliability = Robustness × Generalisation. Albeit learned from a
known dataset, deep learning is expected to work well on unknown,
or unseen, data. Generalisation error measures the gap between a
deep learning model’s performance on known and unknown data.
Robustness error appears when a decision (e.g., a classification) is
changed over an invisible perturbation to the input.
In the following sections, I will review a few categories of V&V
methods that have been explored in order to deal with the reliability
of deep learning. Please refer to [10] for a comprehensive review.
1 FORMAL VERIFICATION
Formal verification requires mathematically rigorous proof to argue
for or against the satisfiability of a property on a given deep learning
model. Existing verification algorithms are mainly focused on point-
wise robustness, i.e., the robustness of the model over a given input.
The algorithms can be roughly categorised into constraint-solving
based methods [13], abstract interpretation based methods [5, 14],
global optimisation based methods [11, 15, 16], and game-based
methods [23, 24]. The first two categories treat the deep learning
as a white-box, with the computation needed on all neurons. This
results in the scalability issue due to the complexity of the problem
and the size of the deep learning. The latter two categories can work
with real-world deep learning, but are still subject to the curse of
dimensionality.
The difficulties of formal verification have led to the development
of other V&V methods, as described below.
2 STATISTICAL EVALUATION
Statistical evaluation applies statistical methods in order to gain
insights into the verification problem we concern. In addition to the
purpose of determining the existence of failures (i.e., counterexam-
ples to the satisfiability of desirable properties) in the deep learning
model, statistical evaluation assesses the satisfiability of a property
in a probabilistic way, by e.g., aggregating sampling results. The
aggregated evaluation result may have probabilistic guarantee, in
the form of e.g., the probability of failure rate lower than a threshold
l is greater than 1 − ϵ , for some small constant ϵ .
For the robustness, sampling methods and testing methods have
been considered. Sampling methods, such as [22], are to summarise
property-related statistics from the samples. Testing methods, on
the other hand, generate a set of test cases and use the generated
test cases to evaluate the reliability (or other properties) of deep
learning. There are a number of ways to determine how the test
cases are generated, including e.g., fuzzing, coverage metrics [8, 18],
symbolic execution [6], concolic testing [19], etc. While sampling
methods can have probabilistic guarantees via e.g., Chebyshev’s
inequality, it is still under investigation on how to associate test
coverage metrics with probabilistic guarantee.
For the generalisation error, other than the empirical approach
of using a set of test data to evaluate, recent efforts on complexity
measure [3, 12] suggest that it is possible to estimate generalisation
error – with theoretical bound – by only considering the weights
of the deep learning without resorting to the test dataset.
3 PROBABILISTIC ASSESSMENT AND
SAFETY ARGUMENT
While the above techniques may compute the (un)satisfiability of a
property as well as its associated evidence, the specifications they
work with are usually low-level ones, such as the point-wise ro-
bustness which only concerns the robustness w.r.t. a given input. It
is needed to understand if and how the evidence to these low-level
specifications can contribute to the claim of higher-level reliability
specification such as “a deep learning model can be free from failure
for the next k inferences”. In [25], we show how to develop a princi-
pled safety argument to justify the reliability claim by aggregating
evidence from either formal verification or statistical evaluation
with Bayesian inference [17]. Due to the unknown ground truth
over the underlying data distribution, this approach usually re-
quires to either make an assumption over the distribution [22] or
learn the distribution [26]. Note that, the obtained probabilistic
assessment can be bounded [2, 12].
One step further, it might be interesting to understand, and verify,
the safety and reliability issues in learning-enabled autonomous
systems where deep learning components interact with symbolic
or probabilistic components [9, 20].
4 RUNTIME MONITORING
The above approaches require significant computation. Worse than
that, a deep learning model might be applied to scenarios different
from where the training data is collected. These suggest the need of
a runtime monitor to determine the satisfiability of a specification
on the fly.
Given the missing of specification, the current runtime moni-
toring methods for deep learning start from constructing an ab-
straction of a property, followed by determining the failure of the
property by checking the distance between the abstraction and the
original learning model. There are a few existing methods on ab-
straction of deep learning. For example, in [4], a Boolean abstraction
on the ReLU activation pattern of some specific layer is considered
and monitored. Conversely of Boolean abstraction, [7] consider
box abstractions. In [1], we consider a Bayesian network based
abstraction, which abstracts hidden features as random variables.
5 FUTURE CHALLENGES
V&V for deep learning is still in its infancy. All the above directions
are still far from resolved and currently under intensive investiga-
tion. More future challenges will come from novel deep learning
models and novel applications. Notably, continual learning suggests
that a learning system may have to continuously update itself with
the coming of new data or new tasks, and distributed learning, or
more specifically federated learning, requires multiple agents to
learn a global model with different sources of training data. How to
extend the existing V&V approaches to these more involved deep
learning models will be a significant challenge.
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